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MONOPOLIES IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
The free enterprise system, which is the basis and foundation of
our American economy, survives and is strengthened by the ingen-
uity and the initiative of the individual. As long as the individual
is allowed to remain free and unrestrained in his quest for economic
security, the economy itself will prosper and flourish. The economic
history of this country has witnessed a steady growth and trend to-
ward concentration and combination in the field of business. Though
this trend has produced a more productive society, for out of it
came our mass production, our efficiency, and even our factory sys-
tem, yet we see so vividly from our history, that unless this trend is
guided then it will destroy itself and the very purpose and reason
for its creation. The Federal Government has played the principal
role in the guidance of this trend through legislation with perhaps
the key words being "a free and competitive society".
This concentration and combination in business, more commonly
called monopoly, is a vast and perplexing problem affecting every
scope of our economic system. This note is an attempt to deal with
merely one phase of that problem, namely, monopolies in the motion
picture industry.
WHAT Is A MONOPOLY
"The courts have found great difficulty in formulating an authori-
tative definition of the term 'monopoly'. Originally the term neces-
sarily implied a grant from the sovereign power. In time, however,
the term acquired a much broader significance, and it is no longer
confined to a grant of privileges, but is understood to include a con-
dition produced by the acts of individuals; and its dominant thought
now is the suppression of competition of the unification of interest
or management, or it may be through agreement and concert of ac-
tion."1  The courts, in more specific instances, have stated that a
combination effectively excluding or attempting to exclude outsiders
from a business altogether is a "monopoly" and is unlawful;2 but
1. 58 C. J. S. 954.
2. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 2 (1946);
American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 147 F. 2d 93 (6th Cir. 1945), certiorari denied,
324 U. S. 836 (1945); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 324 U. S. 836
(1945), and R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 325 U. S. 856 (1945), rehear-
ing denicd, 324 U. S. 891 (1945); Aff'd. 328 U. S. 781 (1945).
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a restraint of trade involving the elimination of a competitor is to be
deemed reasonable or unreasonable on the basis of matters affecting
the trade itself and not on the relative cost of doing business of the
persons engaged in competition.3 The material consideration in as-
certaining the existence of a monopoly is not whether the prices are
raised or that competition is actually excluded, but whether the
power exists to raise prices or to exclude competition when it is de-
sired to do so.4 The courts further recognize that monopolistic power
is usually displayed by size and vertical integration5 and take these
basic signs into consideration. Although a "conspiracy to monopo-
lize", 6 within the inhibition of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, is a
conspiracy to control the industry in which the defendant is engaged,
by means which will prevent others from engaging in fair competi-
tion with him,7 it should be remembered that purpose is never an
excuse in cases of alleged conspiracy in restraint of trade, but it is
the intent of the accused or the necessary result of his conduct that
is important. 8 The purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is not
solely to suppress combinations which restrain competition 9 and a
prohibition against infliction of a particular type of public injury,
but is also a limitation of rights which may be pushed to evil conse-
quences and therefore restrained. 10
HISTORY OF MONOPOLY IN T1E MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY
The application of the Anti-Trust Acts to the motion picture in-
dustry has been long continued and erratic. This uncertainty as to
the position of the industry within the framework of the Acts has
been most noticeable during the past 12 years. In 1938, the Federal
3. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.
(1946); American Federation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 183 Fed. 2d 869
(4th Cir. 1950).
4. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1-7 (1946);
U. S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (D. C. N. Y. 1950).
5. Ibid. (Vertical integration, which is simply a particular of size, is a
relevant consideration in ascertaining monopoly power under the Sherman Act.
Vertical integration in an industry, without more, does not violate the Sherman
Act, and the extent of permissible integration must be governed, as other
factors in Sherman Act violations, by other circumstances of individual cases.)
6. U. S. v. Waltham Watch Co., 47 F. Supp. 524 (D. C. N. Y. 1943). A "con-
spiracy in restraint of trade" differs from a "contract in restraint of trade" in
that a "conspiracy" although constituted by an agreement is the result of the
agreement rather than the agreement itself.
7. U. S. v. National Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n., 40 F. Supp. 488 (D. C.
Colo. 1941).
8. U. S v. Gold, 115 F. 2d 236 (2nd Cir. 1940).
9. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 31-7 (1946);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943).
10. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890) § 1, as amended, 15
U. S. C. § 1 (1946); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. U. S., 309 U. S. 436 (1940).
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Government brought a suit against the major producer-distributors,
the main purpose of which was to divest the defendants of their
exhibition houses. In 1940, the Government acquiesced in a con-
sent decree under which the industry was given three years in which
to govern itself." Currently, the Government is once again attempt-
ing to divest the major motion picture companies of their exhibition
interests.1 2 Through the early years of monopolistic control, a definite
and settled pattern developed. The production, distribution, and ex-
hibition of motion pictures was dominated by eight companies, five
of which either owned or were affiliated with circuits of exhibition
houses. As vertical integration progressed, there was combination at
the exhibitor level into the circuits of theatres not controlled by these
majors. 13 Although the great majority of the theatres remained in-
dependent, the vertical integration and horizontal combination, re-
inforced by unique trade practices, -resulted in a steady deterioration
of the position of the independent exhibitor. There finally emerged
three distinct forms of monopolistic control in the motion picture
industry: the first being the combination set up by the distributors
and producers, i. e., those stemming from the motion picture indus-
try itself; the second being the local combinations created by the ex-
hibitors in cities and sometimes extending to larger areas; and the
third classification being a combination of the first two.
In the early 1920's, legislation aimed to discourage this concentra-
tion in the industry was enacted; but, although a continual stream
of state and federal anti-trust suits by private parties14 and by the
Federal Government 15 suggested the extent to which an anti-com-
petitive pattern had been established in the industry, the suits did
not challenge the basic structure of the industry. These suits were
directed against specific trade abuses, but were only partially success-
ful, and did not attack the integration of production and exhibition
which was the keystone of the industry's structure. 10 The Govern-
11. C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. (8th ed., 1940) § 25,558.
12. U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, Civil Action No. 87-273 (D. C. N. Y. 1938).
13. U. S. v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 (1945) ; U. S. v. Schine
Chain Theatres, C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. (9th ed., 1945) § 57,413 (D. C.
N. Y., 1945).
14. Love v. Kozy Theatre Co., 193 Ky. 336, 236 S. W. 243 (1921). Specific
performance of lease refused on ground that directors of local circuit were
using plaintiff's theatre to monopolize exhibitions. Peekskill Theatre, Inc. v.
Advance Theatrical Co. of N. Y., 206 App. Div. 138, 200 N. Y. Supp. 726
(1923). Injunction granted against exhibitors restraining them from coercing
distributors into boycotting the plaintiff.
15. U. S. v. Fox Theatres Corp., C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. (Supp. Vol. III,
(1931) §§ 3125, 3127.
16. U. S. v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 Fed. 800 (D. C. Pa. 1915),
app. dismissed, 247 U. S. 524 (1918). This was the only suit in which the
3
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ment, realizing that it must attack the roots of the problem, returned
to the position it had taken in 1938, i. e., that there must be a divesti-
ture of exhibition houses from the producer-distributor owners.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A MONOPOLY IN THE MOTION
PICTUlE INDUSTRY
Monopolies are defined by the courts and authorities in general
and vague terms, but to determine exactly what is and what is not
a monopoly, one must resort to the particular circumstances of each
individual case.
An analysis of monopolies in each of the three classifications pre-
viously mentioned clearly reveals some of the problems and situa-
tions confronting the courts. The first of these classifications is that
of a combination by the distributors and producers of motion pic-
tures. Generally, the business involving the distribution of motion
picture films and the transportation and delivery of such films across
state lines, is interstate commerce and subject to the federal anti-trust
statutes.17 Combinations and contracts tending substantially to create
monopoly and restrict competition in the motion picture industry are
in violation of those anti-trust statutes ;18 but where a combination
or agreement is lacking, the fact that the business method practiced
by a motion picture film distributor tends to exclude other indepen-
dent producers, does not establish a violation of the statutes. 19 The
courts have unanimously held that where interstate distributors of mo-
tion picture films agree among themselves to impose certain restric-
tions on "subsequent run exhibitors", these distributors are guilty
of conspiring in the unlawful restraint of interstate commerce and
such "conspiracy" will be enjoined. It is further held that where
a distributor knows that such concerted action is contemplated and
gives his adherence to the scheme and participates therein, he is equal-
ly guilty of unlawfully conspiring to restrain interstate commerce,
since an actual agreement for imposition of the restrictions is not an
essential prerequisite.
20
Government secured a drastic alteration of the structure of the industry.
Following the dissolution of the patent monopoly, the copyright became the
basis of the restrictions placed upon the right to exhibit films.
17. U. S. v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 (1944); rehearing
denied, 323 U. S. 818 (1945); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291
(1923); White Bear Theatre Corporation v. State Theatre Corporation, 129
F. 2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942); U. S. v. Schine Chain Theatres, 31 F. Supp. 270
(D. C. N. Y. 1940).
18. U. S. v. Schine Chain Theatres, supra note, 17.
19. Federal Trade Commission v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., 57 F.
2d 152 (2nd Cir. 1932).
20. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946).
Interstate Circuit v. U. S., 306 U. S. 208 (1939).
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol3/iss4/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
Although the courts may seem to enforce the anti-trust statutes
arbitrarily at times, they have not interfered with the distributor's
right to select his customers and to sell to them on such terms as he
sees fit. An exhibitor does not have the absolute right to demand
of a distributor the privilege to exhibit his films ;21 but any combina-
tion of the major distributors of motion picture films to impose com-
mon restrictions on the exhibition of such films is a violation of the
federal anti-trust laws.
22
The second classification is the restraint of trade induced by com-
binations of exhibitors. Although motion picture exhibitors may
organize and combine for the reasonable promotion of their economic
activities without violating the federal anti-trust statutes, as in the
case of a co-operative of exhibitors for the purpose of purchasing
films, yet the courts hold that the activities of such an organization
are illegal where it uses its economic power to prevent distributors
from doing business with nonmembers except on restrictive terms
or where its activities are designed to restrict competition and create
a monopoly.
2 3
The courts have more specifically held that an agreement by a
combination of exhibitors not to deal with a certain film distributor
until better terms are offered, or to urge the public not to patronize
theatres doing business with such distrib'utors, is a violation of the
anti-trust statute.24 Furthermore, a combination of exhibitors to
drive their competitors out of business and establish a monopoly by
their combined purchasing power to compel distributors to restrict
their dealings with competitors, is also a violation.2 5 Even an oper-
ating agreement between individually owned theatres, normally in
competition with each other, to operate as a unit and to divide pro-
fits in accordance with a prearranged formula is considered to be a
monopoly.26 However, a theatre circuit may so utilize its efforts
as to illegally stifle competition or monopolize theatre business in dif-
ferent locations, but since motive is an essential element, any one of
21. William Goldman Theatres v. Leow's Inc., 150 F. 2d 738 (3rd Cir. 1945);
Westway Theatre v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 113 F. 2d 932 (4th
Cir. 1940); Mid-West Theatres Co. v. Co-operative Theatres of Mich., 43 F.
Supp. 216 (D. C. Mich. 1941).
22. Interstate Circuit v. U. S., 306 U. S. 208 (1939).
23. U. S. v. First Nat. Pictures Inc., 282 U. S. 44 (1930).
24. Paramount Pictures v. United Motion Picture Theatre Owners of Eastern
Penn., Southern N. J. & Del., 93 F. 2d 714 (3rd Cir. 1938).
25. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890) ; §§ 1, 2, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1,
2, (1946); U. S. v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 (1944), rehearing
denied 323 U. S. 818 (1945).
26. U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, 306 U. S. 208 (1939).
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such efforts, disassociated from any other, would not violate the Sher-
man Act.
2 7
The third and last classification is a combination of the distribu-
tors and the exhibitors of the film industry for mutual benefit. Such
a combination for the purpose of fixing prices for admission to an
exhibition of a motion picture is a violation of the federal statute per
se, as in the supplying of films by a distributor to exhibitors under
an agreement whereby minimum admission prices are fixed by the
distributor.2 8 However, the courts seem to feel that a mere agree-
ment for the purchase of "first run" motion pictures and reasonable
clearances does not violate the Sherman Act, since the charge of a
"conspiracy" contemplates a combination of two or more persons
by some concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose, and
"monopolization" contemplates acts to monopolize or control trade
or commerce between states to exclusion and disadvantage of others.2 9
Therefore, the practice of giving clearance or protection in licensing
the exhibition of a film, i. e., contracting that the film will not be
released for exhibition to a competing theatre until a specified num-
ber of days after its exhibition by the licensee, is a reasonable re-
straint of trade and is not considered a violation of the statute per seP o
provided the clearance provisions resulted from negotiations made
separately between individual exhibitors and distributors in free and
open competition with other exhibitors and distributors. However,
where the major distributors of the motion picture industry act in
concert in the formation and application of a uniform pattern of
clearance for the theatres to which they license their films, the anti-
trust act is violated.8 '
Consequently, the courts have ruled that distributors have the
legal right to contract for the exhibition of their films by exhibitors,
provided it does not exclude their right to contract with other exhibi-
tors, and such a contract, which is the result of a common under-
standing, is illegal.
82
27. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2 (1946);
U. S. v. Schine Chain Theatres, 63 F. Supp. 229 (D. C. N. Y. 1946), appeal
dismissed 329 U. S. 686 (1946), and 329 U. S. 686 (1946), vacated on, rehearing
329 U. S. 817 (1946), affirned in part and reversed in part 334 U. S. 110
(1948), petition denied 334 U. S. 831 (1948).
28. U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. 323 (D. C. N. Y. 1939);
Interstate Circuit v. U. S., 306 U. S. 208 (1939).
29. See note 27, supra.
30. Gary Theatre Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 120 F. 2d 891 (7th Cir.
1941) ; U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. 323 (D. C. N. Y. 1939);
reversed in part on other grounds 306 U. S. 20 (1939); Mid-West Theatres
Co. v. Co-operative Theatres of Mich., 43 F. Supp. 216 (D. C. Mich. 1941).
31. See note 28, supra.
32. U. S. v. Interstate Circuit, 20 F. Supp. 686 (D. C. Tex. 1937). Set
aside Interstate Circuit v. U. S., 304 U. S. 55 (1937).
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Thus in analyzing the three circumstances in which monopolies
may arise in the motion picture industry, it seems apparent from the
cases that Congress intended, by the anti-trust acts, to prevent all
combinations and conspiracies, whether composed of employees, em-
ployers, producers, users, or consumers, from unreasonably restrain-
ing free flow of interstate commerce.3 3 Good motives and intentions
or a person's desire to have his own or another person's business
prosper are no defense to actions brought for the violation of the
anti-trust laws,3 4 for they are not the criteria of liability in anti-trust
cases,3 5 since the interest of the public in the preservation of compe-
tition is the primary consideration. 6
EvmzNc4
Where the anti-trust statutes are violated, either civil or criminal
proceedings may be instituted against the defendant for such viola-
tions. In civil cases the general rules of evidence are applicable as
to presumptions, burden of proof, admissibility and the weight and
sufficiency of evidence, in actions to recover damages for injuries
resulting from unlawful combinations in restraint of trade or creat-
ing or tending to create a monoply, or from violations of anti-trust
laws. The courts generally hold that the "jury are required to base
their verdict on a preponderance of all the competent evidence",
8 7
and that the plaintiff has the burden of proving all the facts essential
to the establishment of his cause of action. It has been stated by
one court that in determining applicability of the Sherman Act in
cases of partial or local control, the illegal purpose may be proved
only by what has been done or by direct evidence of purpose of com-
bination, and not by what might have been done.3 8 Where the plain-
tiff's proof supports an inference of concerted action, the burden
rests on the defendants to go forward with the evidence to rebut
such inference.3 9 Thus, the plaintiff must show acts, contracts, or
combinations unlawful under the statutes ;40 and in addition that some
actual damages,4 1 susceptible of expression in figures,42 have accrued
33. See note 24, supra.
34. See note 32, supra.
35. Leader Theatre Corp. v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 186 Misc. 280,
58 N. Y. S. 2d 304 (1945).
36. See note 23, supra.
37. Bigelow v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures, 327 U. S. 251 (1946), rehearing
denied 327 U. S. 817 (1946).
38. William Goldman Theatres v. Loew's, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 1011, (D. C.
Pa. 1944), reversed 150 F. 2d 738 (3rd Cir. 1945).
39. Ibid.
40. Momand v. Universal Film Exch., 72 F. Supp. 469 (D. C. Mass. 1947).
41. Lewis v. Archbell, 199 N. C. 205, 154 S. E. 11 (1930).
42. Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 4 F. R. D. 114 (D. C. N. Y. 1943).'
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to his business or property; and that such damages were proximately
caused by the alleged violations.43 In the absence of proof as to the
amount of damages suffered, such damages being the proximate result
of the defendant's acts pursuant to an illegal system of film release,
plaintiffs, motion picture exhibitors, are not entitled to recover treble
damages under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 44 It has been further
held that damages - such as loss of profit in new business venture,
or loss of money invested in the enterprise, including sums owed for
operational expenses and damages by reason of loss of leases and
rights thereunder - cannot be proved by evidence of the operational
records of the previous owner, but that may become a question for
the jury.45 In an action based on discriminatory operation of a film
release system, a comparison of the exhibitor's receipts before and
after the unlawful system impinging on his business affords suffici-
ent basis for the jury's computation of damages, where the wrongful
system prevents exhibitors from making any further precise proof
of the amount of damages.
46
In criminal prosecutions for the violation of the anti-trust sta-
tutes the rules generally applicable in such actions apply as to the
presumptions, burden of proof, and the interpretations of and infer-
ences to be drawn from the evidence, and the weight and sufficiency
of such evidence must be proved, as in all criminal suits, beyond a
reasonable doubt.
PLADING
In actions in the state courts, the complaint must allege facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the statute invoked.
Thus it is not sufficient merely to allege the existence of the monopo-
ly, or merely to repeat the words of the statute, or to recite mere
conclusions of the pleader, but the plaintiff must allege facts show-
ing the agreement, plan or scheme which the defendants have adopted,
the several acts performed by them, the unlawfulness of their con-
duct, and the resulting injury to himself or his business. 47
Actions in the federal courts are governed by the Federal Rules
43. Quittner v. Motion Picture Producers & Distributors of America, 50 F.
2d 266 (D. C. N. Y. 1931).
44. Bigelow v. R. K 0. Radio Pictures, 150 F. 2d 877 (7th Cir. 1945),
reversed on other grounds, 327 U. S. 251 (1946), rehearing denied 327 U. S.
817 (1946); William Goldman Theatres v. Loew's Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103 (D. C.
Pa. 1945).
45. See note 37, supra.
46. Quemos Theatre Co v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 35 F. Supp. 949 (D. C.
N. J. 1940).
47. Foster v. Shubert Holding Co., 316 Mass. 470, 55 N. E. 2d 772 (1944).
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of Civil Procedure adopted in 1948. Rule No. 8(a) states that "a
pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of juris-
diction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled". These
rules are the subject of a great deal of controversy, but the interpre-
tation generally given them is similar to that given to actions brought
in the state courts. It has been held by some courts that a motion
for a more definite statement as to names of theatres and exhibitors
involved would be allowed, but that a motion for a bill of particulars
as to acts constituting conspiracy and monoply would be denied,
where conduct charged as constituting such acts was sufficiently set
forth in the complaint to enable defendants to answer and prepare
for trial.48 Other courts have held that the plaintiff was required
clearly to inform the defendants of wrongful acts with which they
were charged, with sufficient definiteness to enable the defendants
to determine any admissions or denials that should be incorporated
in a pleading, if an answer should be interposed, or to proceed by
motion in the event the defendants should seek to challenge the suffi-
ciency of allegations leveled at it. This interpretation is correct from
the stand point of fairness to the parties concerned. While the courts
may not be in agreement as to the interpretation of the previously
mentioned section of the Rules of Civil Procedure, they do seem to
agree on the question of the sufficiency of a complaint, in that the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Clayton Act are independent en-
actments and violations of either constitute a separate offense which
should be pleaded by separate paragraphs so that each defendant
would be clearly informed of the statute or statutes which it is
claimed to have violated. 4 9
DAMAGtS
The damages provided for under the federal anti-trust laws are
both punitive and compensatory. The amount of compensatory dam-
ages is not fixed by statute, but is unliquidated, and is determined by
48. RuLEs OF CIVII, PROCEDUB" FOR DisTicr COURTs, rule 12(e), 28 U. S. C.,
following section 723c; U. S. v. Schine Chain Theatres, 1 F. R. D. 205 (D. C.
N. Y. 1940).
49. Hennepin Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Pictures, 1 F. R. D. 621 (D. C.
Minn. 1941).
9
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the pecuniary loss to the plaintiff's business or property50 resulting
proximately from the conspiracy or combination.5 ' Only actual
damages which can be liquidated and not those purely speculative,
remote, uncertain, or conjectural, are recoverable as compensatory
damages. Punitive damages cannot be recovered unless a case for
compensatory damages is first made, and once these have been de-
termined, the plaintiff, under the section providing for treble dam-
ages, shall automatically be entitled to three times such amount,
neither the jury nor the court having any discretion in the matter.
The verdict should represent actual damages sustained, and the
amount of the verdict must be trebled so that two-thirds of the judg-
ment will be a penalty ;52 but, if no specific damages were shown by
an established combination, at least nominal damages would accrue
to the plaintiff as well as injunctive relief sought.0 An injunction
may be properly issued only to prevent a continuance or recurrence of
the unlawful practices and may not be issued as a penalty or punish-
ment for a past violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.5 4
CONCLUSION
We thus see from this discussion that there exists a conflict be-
tween the objectives of the anti-trust laws and the pattern estab-
lished in the motion picture industry over the past years. These
anti-trust laws, which the federal and state governments have passed,
are for the purpose of guiding our economy so that there will be a
maximum benefit for a maximum number of people, rather than an
economy of "the survival of the fittest". Although uncertainty and
confusion still may be found in the Government's approach, it ap-
pears, at last, that the Department of justice may accept as its stan-
dard the words of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Crescent case: "It
is not for us . . . to pick and choose between competing business
and economic theories in applying . . . (the Sherman Act). Con-
gress has made that choice. It has declared that the rule of trade and
commerce shall be competition, not combination". 55
MELTON KLIGMAN.
50. See note 38, supra.
51. See note 40, supra.
52. See note 37, supra.
53. United Exhibitors v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Distribution Corp.,
31 F. Supp. 316 (D. C. Pa. 1940).
54. U. S. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 3 F. R. D. 331 (D. C. N. Y. 1943).
55. U. S. v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 187 (1945).
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